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EFFECTIVE LAW-ENFORCEMENT
TECHNIQUES FOR REDUCING CRIME
JOHN N. GALLO'
In their article Asymmetrical Causation and Criminal Desistance,
Christopher Uggen and Irving Piliavin discuss "devising theo-
retically relevant interventions."' As a white-collar criminal de-
fense attorney and a former federal prosecutor, I have been
asked for my personal perspective on what law-enforcement
techniques, a type of "relevant interventions," have been effec-
tive in reducing crime. Given my background, it seems I am
most qualified to comment on that question from the perspec-
tive of law-enforcement, and in particular from the vantage
point of federal law-enforcement. Viewed from this perspective,
the question I address in this article is whether federal law-
enforcement has played a significant role in reducing crime
and, if so, what law-enforcement techniques have been effective
in that regard?
In summary, my experience has been that law-enforcement
has had an impact in deterring and/or reducing criminal activ-
ity, but that the type of deterrence generally varies depending
on the nature of the criminal activity. Specifically, in the case of
white-collar crime, where the actors are generally rational, in-
formed individuals, enforcement of criminal laws generally de-
ters additional criminal conduct of the kind at issue; in other
words, the prosecution of one will deter others from committing
similar criminal conduct. On the other hand, in the case of vio-
lent crime, the prosecution of an individual is far less likely to
deter others from engaging in the same criminal conduct, ei-
ther because such actors do not act rationally or because they
Partner at Sidley & Austin in Chicago. The author is formerly an Assistant
United States Attorney in the Northern District of Illinois, and Deputy Chief of the
Criminal Division, 1994-1996.
IChristopher Uggen & Irving Piliavin, Asymmetrical Causation and Criminal Desis-
tance, 88J. QuM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1399, 1413 (1998).
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are unaware of the punishment for their conduct. At times,
prosecution of violent offenders may individually deter criminal
conduct, that is, prevent the same individual from committing
similar acts again. Some violent offenders, however, if given the
opportunity, will repeat their criminal conduct regardless of
how many times they are prosecuted. In these cases, the only ef-
fective law-enforcement tool is incapacitation of that individual,
usually through incarceration.
These principles, if validated, have significant implications
for the way our society allocates its law-enforcement resources
and for the way it punishes criminal offenders. In particular, in
the case of white-collar offenses, law-enforcement is most effec-
tive and efficient if it targets particular types of criminal conduct
and publicizes prosecutions. For violent offenders, on the other
hand, law-enforcement will by necessity be generally more reac-
tive; in this case, however, once society prosecutes an individual,
it is vital that society aggressively supervise (including drug test)
that individual as part of some probationary sentence served af-
ter any period of incarceration. Finally, in the case of corrupt,
violent organizations, law-enforcement is most effective if it tar-
gets for prosecution the leaders of those organizations, causes
their long-term incapacitation, then identifies and targets their
successors.
I. WHITE COLLAR CRIME
For purposes of this commentary, "white collar crime" refers
to non-violent criminal offenses committed in an institutional or
commercial context.2 Examples include fraud of all kinds (in-
cluding wire, mail, and bank fraud), public corruption, com-
mercial bribery (including payment or receipt of kickbacks),
antitrust violations, and environmental offenses. White-collar
offenders generally are motivated by profit, and are usually ra-
tional, informed actors who will assess the risks versus the bene-
2 Black's Law Dictionary defines white-collar crimes as "unlawful, non-violent
conduct committed by corporations and individuals including theft or fraud and
other violations of trust committed in the course of the offender's occupation (e.g.,
embezzlement .... antitrust violations, price fixing .... and the like)." BLACK'S LAW
DICIONARY 1596 (6th ed. 1990).
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fits of engaging in criminal conduct. As further discussed in the
examples below, white-collar crime is more prevalent in areas
where law-enforcement has not devoted resources or has not
been effective. When, however, law-enforcement is effective in
enforcing the criminal laws against a small number in a white-
collar area, oftentimes the result is that the larger group in that
area conform their conduct to the law.
To highlight this principle, what follows are a series of ex-
amples of white-collar prosecutions and a discussion of the ob-
served impact of the same on the conduct of those in the
affected area.
A. OPERATION GREmLoRD
Perhaps one of the most notable examples of the impact of
targeted law-enforcement on white-collar crime is "Operation
Greylord," a federal probe of corruption in the Circuit Court of
Cook County, Illinoiss that began with an undercover investiga-
tion in the late 1970s. At the start of the probe, the Circuit
Court was notorious for its corrupt judges and attorneys, and
bribery and extortion were rampant. At the end of the probe,
fifteen judges and forty-nine lawyers had gone to prison for
bribery and/or tax-related offenses; a total of 103 attorneys at
one time or another faced charges of criminal or unprofessional
conduct.4
The investigation resulted in the creation of a commission
to investigate how the Circuit Court functioned. That commis-
sion recommended a series of changes, many of which were
adopted by the Circuit Court. Those changes included judges
being rotated through various branches of the Court every eight
to twelve months; cases being assigned on a random basis, fre-
quently by computer; new judges receiving ethics training; and
attorneys having to sign in at the courthouse and list their cases
(thereby reducing the possibility that they will solicit or "hustle"
cases).5 The result of the investigation and subsequent court-
Cook County encompasses all of Chicago and some of the surrounding suburbs.
Abdon M. Pallasch, Chicago Lawyer Special Report Greylord Update, CHICAGO
LAWYER, Sept. 1995, at 14.
5 Id at 18.
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reforms has been that the Court no longer is reputed among
lawyers to be a bastion of corruption.
B. BANKRUPTCY FRAUD
A recent example of the impact of a single white-collar
prosecution on a much wider group arose in the area of bank-
ruptcy law. The federal prosecution in Milwaukee, Wisconsin,
of a former partner of a large New York law firm sent ripples
throughout the bankruptcy bar of the United States, and re-
sulted in widespread attention to what had formerly been a
fairly routine required series of filings for a lawyer seeking to
represent a debtor in a bankruptcy proceeding.
Specifically, in December, 1997, a federal grand jury re-
turned an indictment charging John Gellene with having failed
to make material disclosures to the bankruptcy court in 1994 in
connection with the process by which the bankruptcy court ul-
timately appointed Gellene's law firm to represent a Milwaukee
company, the Bucyrus-Erie Company, in a proceeding pursuant
to Chapter 11 of the United States Code.6 In particular, the
bankruptcy rules require a law firm seeking court appointment
to represent the debtor in bankruptcy to disclose to the court all
of the law firm's connections to the debtor, creditors, and any
other party in interest in the bankruptcy proceeding. Accord-
ing to the indictment, Mr. Gellene failed to disclose to the
bankruptcy court that his firm also represented the senior se-
cured-creditor and one of the creditor's principals at the time of
the bankruptcy proceeding. In February 1998, a federal jury in
Wisconsin found Mr. Gellene guilty as charged in the indict-
ment.8
Even prior to Mr. Gellene's indictment, during the grand-
jury phase of the federal investigation, the bankruptcy bar was
focused on the implications of the matter for practitioners filing
similar disclosure declarations in other jurisdictions.9 The fed-
6 Indictment, United States v. Gellene (E.D. Wis. 1997) (No. 97 CR 221).
'FED. R. BANKR. P. 2014(a).8 Indictment at 3, Gellene (No. 97 CR 221) (citing FED. R. BANKR. P. 2014).
Should Milbank Tweed Be Required To Disgorge $1.8 Million Fee., 7 BANKRUPTCY
COURT DECISIONS, Sept. 16, 1997, at Al.
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eral prosecution in Milwaukee was followed by careful bank-
ruptcy-court scrutiny of other disclosure statements filed by law
firms in other jurisdictions. Law firms have become "hypersen-
sitive" to disclosure of their connections to creditors and other
parties-in-interest in the bankruptcy setting.'° Firms began to
review their internal procedures for spotting potential conflicts-
of-interest, and have become more candid in their disclosures to
bankruptcy judges." In one case, a law firm attached to its dis-
closure statement a computerized printout of all the firm's cli-
ents. In response to the federal scrutiny on bankruptcy
disclosure, some law firms have begun consulting with govern-
ment representatives for assistance on formulating ways to im-
prove their internal identification of clients with connections to
bankruptcy proceedings.
C. HEALTH CARE F AUD
Starting in the early 1990s, an increase in the federal inves-
tigative resources devoted to the investigation and prosecution
of health-care fraud and abuse has led to widespread corporate
attention in the health-care industry to addressing the problems
of fraud and abuse. For example, from 1991 to 1993, the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation tripled the number of agents as-
signed to investigate health-care fraud and abuse.'3 In May
1995, President Clinton launched "Operation Restore Trust," a
special initiative of the Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices against health-care fraud, waste, and abuse. Operation Re-
store Trust established a demonstration project focused on
home-health care, nursing homes, and durable medical equip-
" Mathew Goldstein, Lawyers Go Over Limit: Bankruptcy Attorneys Learn Lessons in
Disclosure, CRAIN's N.Y. BUS.,June 1, 1998, at 3.
1 Id
" FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNITED STATES DEP'TJUSTICE, HEALTH CARE
FRAUD PROGRAM (pamphlet on file with Journal of Criminazl Law & riminology).
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ment suppliers in five states.14 From 1995 to 1996, the number
of federal prosecutions linked to health care increased by 60%."5
With the increased federal focus on health-care fraud and
abuse, there has been a revolution in the attention spent by
public and private health-care institutions on issues relating to
fraud and abuse. In response to the demand of clients, most
large law firms have expanded their health care practices to
provide advice and counseling to institutions concerned about
developments in the area. Health-care institutions have created
internal codes of conduct and audit programs and hired com-
pliance officers to monitor compliance with relevant statutes
and regulations. Health-care institutions and professionals
monitor federal investigative developments on a regular basis,
and circulate those developments in newsletters and correspon-
dence throughout the industry. The combined impact of the
federal enforcement in an area that had been relatively ne-
glected and of the private reaction to such enforcement has
been a newly-sensitized health-care environment where fraud
and abuse has been effectively deterred.
D. CORPORATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES
On November 1, 1991, the United States Sentencing Com-
mission introduced a new set of guidelines applicable only to
the sentencing of organizations. 6 These "corporate" sentencing
guidelines have revolutionized white-collar law-enforcement by
effectively establishing a system where corporations and other
organizations are driven to police themselves and their employ-
ees. One of the achieved objectives of the corporate sentencing
guidelines has been that many corporate institutions have estab-
lished internal mechanisms for preventing, detecting, and re-
porting criminal conduct. 7 That objective was achieved in part
by the design of the corporate sentencing guidelines, which
" Department of Health & Human Services Press Release, "Operation Restore
Trust Objectives and Accomplishments" (May 13, 1996).
" Monica Langley, A Nonprofit Hospital Finds Its Executives Were Making the Profit,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 1996, at Al.
16 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL, Ch. 8 (1997) [herein-
after USSG].
17 Id., at Ch.8, intro. comment.
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oblige courts sentencing organizations to consider whether the
organization brought the misconduct at issue to the attention of
law-enforcement authorities, i.e., whether the organization vol-
untarily disclosed the misconduct.'
The guidelines also require courts sentencing organizations
to consider whether at the time of the offense, the organization
had "an effective program to prevent and detect violations of
law," also known as a corporate compliance program.'9 The
guidelines detail what defines an effective corporate-compliance
program.2 0 Those minimum requirements include a corporate
code of conduct, the assignment of high-level individuals to
oversee compliance with the code of conduct, effective commu-
nication of the code of conduct to individuals in the organiza-
tion, audit controls to monitor compliance, sanctions for those
who violate the code of conduct, and the taking of reasonable
steps to prevent further offenses after they become known.
Federal law-enforcement authorities responded to the im-
plementation of the corporate sentencing guidelines by estab-
lishing policies further encouraging organizations to disclose
misconduct voluntarily and to establish corporate compliance
programs. For example, both the Department ofJustice (in the
antitrust area) and the Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices (in the area of health-care fraud and abuse) have policies
which state that when the government exercises discretion re-
garding whether or not to prosecute an organization, the gov-
ernment will consider whether the organization made voluntary
disclosure of the offenses and whether the organization had an
effective corporate-compliance program.
The impact of the corporate sentencing guidelines and sub-
sequently-established federal law-enforcement policies has been
significant. Virtually every large corporate institution, fearing
the potentially draconian sanctions resulting from a federal
prosecution of the institution, has established a corporate code
Id., at §8C2.5 (g) ("Self-Reporting, Cooperation, and Acceptance of Responsibil-
ity").
"Id., at §8C2.5 (f) ("Effective Program to Prevent and Detect Violations of Law").




of conduct and an audit program designed to root out corpo-
rate misconduct. In circumstances where an institution identi-
fies misconduct within the organization, the institution
invariably now considers making voluntary disclosure of that
conduct to the government. The result has been that the fed-
eral government has dramatically increased its investigative ca-
pabilities beyond just federal law-enforcement authorities to
include substantial portions of the private sector which now, in
effect, act as the eyes and ears of the federal government.
Examples like the foregoing support the principle that the
prosecution of white-collar offenders deters similarly-situated
potential offenders from committing the same crimes. This ap-
pears to be a function of the rational, informed nature of poten-
tial white-collar offenders. The implication for law-enforcement
authorities is that selective targeting of types of white-collar
crime can efficiently reduce criminal conduct of this kind.
II. VIOLENT CRIME
For purposes of this commentary, "violent crime" refers not
only to offenses against a person (such as murder, assault, and
robbery), but also to narcotics and firearms offenses. Individu-
als who typically commit these types of offenses generally do not
engage in the same cost-benefit analysis that white-collar of-
fenders do, either because violent offender do not act rationally,
or because they are not adequately informed regarding the im-
plications of their criminal conduct. This principle is high-
lighted by the following examples:
A. DRUG "MULES"
Perhaps the classic example of a violent offender acting in
an irrational and/or uninformed manner is the low-level cou-
rier of narcotics such as cocaine. Specifically, depending on
market conditions, a kilogram of cocaine sells for approximately
$20,000 at the retail level. Oftentimes, narcotics dealers hire
individuals to deliver cocaine to buyers and/or to bring the
money back from the purchaser. Such couriers, or "mules,"
frequently are paid a very small percentage of the cost of the
kilogram, such as a few hundred dollars. If, however, a courier
1482 [Vol. 88
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is caught committing the crime, the courier faces a mandatory-
minimum sentence under federal law of five years' imprison-
ment and a fine of $250,000.22 Except in extraordinary circum-
stances, a rational actor would not take on the risk of such
severe penalties for such a meager reward. At times, such of-
fenders are operating under a misunderstanding that if they are
not physically in possession of the cocaine, or if they do not re-
ceive the money at the same time they deliver the cocaine, they
cannot be prosecuted.
B. BANK ROBBERY
The Federal Bureau of Investigation's statistics regarding
robbery, burglary, and larceny of federally-insured financial in-
stitutions (crimes collectively referred to hereafter as "bank
robberies") dramatically highlight the irrational nature of a vio-
lent criminal.23 Specifically, in 1995, a total of 7239 bank rob-
24beries occurred nationwide. The total value of the cash,
securities, and other property taken in those bank robberies was
$61,280,877.55, or an average of approximately $8,465 per bank
robbery.2 Of those 7239 bank robberies, law enforcement has
"solved," that is, arrested the offender(s) in 4583 instances. 6
The solution rate, therefore, for bank robberies committed in
1995 is approximately 63%.
The statistics for 1996 are similar. In 1996, 8536 bank rob-
beries occurred.' The property taken in those bank robberies
totaled $81,522,697.94, or an average of approximately $9,550
per bank robbery.8 Law-enforcement has solved 5122 of those
bank robberies, or 60% of all bank robberies in 1996.' Coin-
2See 21 U.S.C. §841(a) (1994).
2The statistics referred to regarding bank robberies were obtained from the
Chicago Division of the FBI. The reporting date for the statistics was May 7, 1998.
Facsimile from FBI Chicago, to John N. Gallo, (June 17, 1998) (on file with Journal of









bined for the two years, law-enforcement solved approximately
62% of the bank robberies committed; the average amount of
loot gained from each of those robberies was $9,053.
Bank robberies committed in 1995 and 1996 are punishable
under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Specifically, as-
suming a successful federal-prosecution under 18 U.S.C. §2113
(which prohibits "bank robbery and incidental crimes"), an of-
fender with no criminal record who took less than $10,000 faces
a sentence of not less than forty-one to fifty-one months' im-
prisonment without possibility of parole. 0 If the offender has a
prior conviction, brandished a weapon, caused bodily injury, or
threatened death, the guideline range for the offense increases
dramatically.
Despite these statistics, 8264 bank robberies occurred in
1997.31 Thus these offenders committed crimes where the like-
lihood is that they will steal less than $10,000; where the chances
of being arrested are about three out of five; and where the sen-
tence they face if convicted in a federal court is approximately
four years of non-parolable imprisonment. The irrational na-
ture of the commission of the offenses in 1997 is readily appar-
ent.
Finally, the FBI statistics regarding bank robberies are nota-
ble for revealing the importance of carefully monitoring the
conduct of those previously convicted of similar offenses, par-
ticularly drug users. Of those identified as having committed
bank robbery, about one out of four was previously convicted of
a similar offense, about one out of three was on probation or
parole, and (to the extent identifiable) about three out of four
32
were narcotics users.
A personal experience with a repeat narcotics offender
highlights the irrational nature of the violent offender. In 1990,
the Internal Revenue Service learned that a man (hereinafter
"Fat Daddy") in a suburb outside Chicago had purchased his
home with cash and without having any known legitimate
source of income. After further investigation, the federal gov-
30 SeeUSSG, supra note 16, at §2B3.1.
3' See supra note 23.
32 Id.
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ernment obtained a court order calling for the civil forfeiture of
Fat Daddy's home. At the time of the execution of the seizure
order, federal agents confronted Fat Daddy, who admitted his
connection to a wide-ranging narcotics distribution network.
Fat Daddy agreed to cooperate with the federal agents in con-
nection with an investigation into the narcotics network, then
disappeared without maintaining the requested contact with the
agents.
Sometime later, Fat Daddy telephoned a federal agent from
the hospital and reported that he had just been shot. Fat Daddy
suspected that he had been shot by narcotics conspirators suspi-
cious that he was cooperating with the federal government. Fat
Daddy admitted that he had been involved in narcotics distribu-
tion since the civil seizure, but promised to cooperate in the fu-
ture with the federal government. After his release from the
hospital, however, he again ceased communication with the IRS.
Subsequently, a grand jury indicted him for structuring cur-
rency transactions to avoid reporting requirements, he was ar-
rested, and he pled guilty under seal pursuant to a plea
agreement that required him to cooperate with the federal gov-
ernment. Predictably, he again fell out of sight until he was ar-
rested again. This time, the court ordered Fat Daddy detained
until sentencing.
The court ultimately sentenced Fat Daddy to eleven
months' imprisonment, followed by two years' supervised re-
lease. After his release from prison, a United States Probation
Officer carefully supervised Fat Daddy, and required him to be
tested periodically for narcotics use. Whenever he tested posi-
tive for narcotics use, the court ordered Fat Daddy to appear in
court and threatened revocation of his supervised release and
an additional prison term. In this fashion, the federal govern-
ment closely supervised the conduct of an individual who un-
doubtedly will return to the practice of committing crime once
his supervision ends.
In summary, because of the nature of most violent crime,
law-enforcement necessarily is more reactive in responding to
such conduct than it is for white-collar crime, where law-
enforcement effectively can be proactive by targeting types of
1998] 485
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offenses. The prosecution of individual offenders appears to
have little general deterrent effect on other potential offenders.
Law-enforcement, however, potentially can deter individual of-
fenders from repeating similar crimes by aggressively supervis-
ing offenders, including periodically testing such offenders for
drug use. If such supervision fails, the only effective means of
deterring individuals from committing similar violent offenses is
to incapacitate them, usually by imprisonment.
III. CORRUPT/VIOLENT ORGANIZATIONS
Federal law-enforcement faces a unique problem when con-
fronted by criminal conduct of sophisticated violent organiza-
tions like organized crime or gangs. In this circumstance, the
criminal conduct of the organizations typically is not deterred
by the prosecution of other organizations (general deterrence)
or by reacting to the criminal conduct of some of its individual
members (individual deterrence). One of the reasons tradi-
tional forms of law enforcement are ineffective is that the lead-
ership of these organizations typically insulates itself from the
day-to-day operations of the organization, and hires low-level
criminals like the above-mentioned narcotics courier 3 to con-
duct the criminal conduct of the enterprise, with the profits
flowing back to the organization. In this context, the most ef-
fective law-enforcement technique is the identification of the
leadership of the organization, the targeting of that leadership
for investigation, and the use of appropriate means-such as
wiretapping and the use of informants-to make a criminal case
of some kind against the leadership. Once that has been ac-
complished, law-enforcement must remain vigilant in identify-
ing successors to the leadership of the organizations, and repeat
the process.
In this way, over time, such organizations lose their influ-
ence and effectiveness, and wither in terms of their capacity to
terrorize communities. Notable examples of the success of fed-
eral law-enforcement in this regard include investigative efforts
" See supra, Part II(A).
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relating to organized crime in New York and Chicago, and relat-
ing to gang crime in Chicago.
IV. CONCLUSION
In any society, law-enforcement will have an important role
in society's efforts to reduce crime. As we have witnessed crimi-
nal activity decreasing, one of the questions raised has been
what law-enforcement techniques were effective in causing the
reduction in crime. The conclusion of this commentary is that
the type of effective law-enforcement technique depends on the
type of the crime. In the case of white-collar crime, where the
offenders are rational, informed actors, the targeting of a select
group in an identifiable subject area will lead to the deterring
crime by the larger group in that same area. In the case of vio-
lent crime, where offenders are not as rational and/or informed
about the implications of their conduct, law-enforcement is
most effective when it reacts to offenders' conduct by seeking
close societal supervision of offenders, and by seeking incarcera-
tion for those frequent and repeat offenders. In the case of cor-
rupt, violent organizations, law-enforcement must identify the
high-ranking members of the organization, target them for
prosecution and incarceration, then repeat the process with the
successors to the leadership.
1998] 1487
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